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 NOTE 
Takings Care of Business: Using Eminent 
Domain for Solely Economic Development 
Purposes 
State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013). 
GARRETH COOKSEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The controversial ruling in the case of Kelo v. City of New London, 
Connecticut1 was an impetus for a nationwide discourse on eminent domain 
reform.  Most of the public strongly condemned Kelo, which allowed the city 
of New London, Connecticut, to strip Susette Kelo of her home for the devel-
opment of a Pfizer plant.2  Political fallout from Kelo ushered in a surge of 
state legislation that restrained the taking of private property by eminent do-
main.  Some states completely banned condemnation for economic develop-
ment and for blight.3  Missouri, like several other states, took a less strict 
route and banned eminent domain for solely economic purposes, but allowed 
it for blight.4 
Missouri passed Missouri Revised Statute Section 523.271 in the wake 
of nationwide eminent domain reform.5  The Supreme Court of Missouri first 
interpreted the statute in State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan,6 which narrowed the 
ability of developers to use eminent domain for economic development.7  
This Note discusses the Kelo ruling and the Missouri statute enacted in re-
 
* B.A., Truman State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2015; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2013-14.  I am grateful to 
Professor Douglas E. Abrams for his advice and guidance during the drafting and 
editing process. 
 1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2. See QuickVote Poll Asking If Local Governments Should Be Able to Seize 
Homes and Businesses, CNN.COM (June 23, 2005, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
POLLSERVER/results/18442.exclude.html. 
 3. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to 
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2138 (2009).  Blight is defined as an area that “consti-
tutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, 
or welfare in its present condition and use.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2012). 
 4. Somin, supra note 3, at 2122-23. 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2012). 
 6. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 478 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 7. Id. at 482. 
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sponse to it.  It further examines the beneficial and detrimental implications 
that Jackson will have on property rights and the economy in Missouri. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In Jackson, Southeast Missouri Regional Port Authority (the “Port Au-
thority”) sought to purchase a 30.65 acre parcel of undeveloped land owned 
by Velma Jackson and Alicia Seabaugh as trustees.8  The Port Authority 
viewed the parcel as the foundation for a planned development project in the 
area.9  Unfortunately for the Port Authority, the trustees were not willing to 
part with the land.10  Because the trustees were unwilling to sell the parcel, 
the Port Authority attempted to acquire the land through a powerful statutory 
vehicle: eminent domain.11 
The Port Authority is one of fourteen public port authorities in the State 
of Missouri.12  The fourteen port authorities are scattered along the Missouri 
and Mississippi Rivers and function “similar[ly] to Industrial Parks and Eco-
nomic Development Commissions.”13  Each port authority is involved with 
the transfer of cargo and storage, as well as the development of the port dis-
trict that it controls.14  The specific development projects that a port authority 
undertakes vary from port authority to port authority.15  Due to their public 
nature, all the port authorities are organized under Missouri Revised Statutes 
Chapter 68 as a political subdivision of the State of Missouri.16  As such, the 
State has vested in the port authorities the power to acquire property by emi-
nent domain.17 
In Jackson, the 30.65-acre parcel of land in dispute is located in Scott 
County, Missouri and is bordered by land that the Port Authority owns.18  The 
Port Authority operates its port district along the Mississippi River and owns 
between 500 to 600 acres of land in that district, which includes both Scott 
 
 8. Id. at 473. 
 9. Id. at 475. 
 10. Id. at 473. 
 11. Id. at 474. 
 12. MATTHEW B. MCMICHAEL, MO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., UPDATE OF MISSOURI 





 13. Id. 
 14. See Welcome to Our Waterways!, MO. PORT AUTHS., http://www.missou-
riports.org (last visited July 15, 2014). 
 15. MCMICHAEL, supra note 12. 
 16. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 474. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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County and Cape Girardeau County.19  It earns income from two main 
sources: the leasing of land to tenants and the operation of a six-mile railroad 
that allows businesses to transfer freight between trains and barges at the 
harbor.20  In this case, the Port Authority wanted to expand its facilities by 
building a loop track that could handle unit trains.21  Unit trains are longer 
trains, around 100 cars in length, that can carry oil and other cargo.22  The 
current track was ill-equipped to handle trains of this size, and the Port Au-
thority hoped that by building a new loop track it would reduce freight rates 
and increase the business and employment in the area.23 
The Port Authority did not intend to build the loop track on the 30.65-
acre parcel in dispute.24  It already owned the land where the track was to be 
constructed but lacked the funding to complete the project.25  To fund the 
track, the Port Authority sought to condemn the trustees’ land and lease it to 
private parties.26  One private party had already committed to a lease and 
desired to build a tank on the land to hold liquid products, such as oil, until 
the liquid could be loaded onto barges and sent down the Mississippi River.27  
The Port Authority had several other potential lessees who aspired to build 
dry storage units for cargo on the land.28  Parties that did lease the land from 
the Port Authority would receive the income they made from other businesses 
using their tanks and dry storage units.29  In return, the parties would help pay 
for constructing the loop track.30 
 The trustees argued that since the land was being leased to private 
parties, those parties will be the only beneficiaries of the land and, thus, there 
was no public purpose for the taking.31  This, the trustees claimed, was a clear 
violation of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 523.271 and Article I, Section 
28 of the Missouri Constitution.32  The Port Authority argued that leasing the 
land to private entities would help raise money for the loop track, which 
would in turn bring jobs to the area and increase commerce in the port dis-
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 474- 75. 
 21. Id. at 475. 
 22. Id.; Associated Press, Court Blocks Eminent Domain by Port Authority for 
Land Along Mississippi River, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (May 29, 2013, 2:00PM), 
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/court-blocks-eminent-domain-by-port-
authority-for-land-along/article_1380011c-c87f-11e2-9e7b-10604b9f6eda.html. 
 23. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 475. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.; see Associated Press, supra note 22. 
 28. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 475. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 476. 
 32. Id. at 473. 
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trict.33  Therefore, the Port Authority believed the economic development 
served a public purpose.34 
The circuit court ruled that the taking did not violate Section 523.271 or 
Article I, Section 28 of the Missouri Constitution.35  The court reasoned that 
in addition to economic development, leasing the property would help fund 
the loop track, which would help improve river commerce.36  Because the 
economic development would primarily benefit the public, the seizure of the 
property was for a public purpose and the benefit private parties received 
from the seizure was secondary to the public purpose.37 
Following the circuit court ruling, the trustees petitioned the Supreme 
Court of Missouri for a writ of prohibition.38  The court issued the writ and 
ruled in favor of the trustees to make the writ permanent.39  The court held 
that although the Missouri Constitution does not prohibit takings solely for 
economic development, the legislature enacted a statute that prohibited this 
kind of taking.40  Before this case, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 523.271 
had never been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Missouri or the Court of 
Appeals.41  The Supreme Court stated that under the statute, the Port Authori-
ty must prove “its taking is not solely for economic development purposes.”42  
The Port Authority must do this by proving that the purpose of the taking is 
not “solely to provide an increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment, 
[or] general economic health.”43  The Port Authority argued that construction 
of the loop track was a purpose separate from the economic development.44  
However, the court disagreed and ruled that the purpose of the construction of 
the loop track was for economic development.45  Therefore, the court, by its 
ruling in Jackson, established that when a government entity in Missouri 
wants to use eminent domain for economic development, the entity must have 
a clear non-economic purpose in addition to economic development ration-
ales.46 
 
 33. Id. at 478. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 473-74. 
 36. Id. at 473. 
 37. Id. at 473-74. 
 38. Id. at 474. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 478. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 479. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 481. 
 46. Id. at 481-82. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part analyzes eminent domain in two subsections.  First, this Part 
examines how the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United 
States have dealt with eminent domain, highlighting the controversial case of 
Kelo v. City of New London.  This Part then discusses Missouri’s eminent 
domain statute, which was enacted in response to Kelo. 
A. The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain in the United States began in colonial America.47  The 
system was borrowed from Britain, where land could be seized for public 
use.48  Public use in colonial America included such projects as the building 
of dams and roads.49  Many of the states in colonial America did not provide 
any compensation for the land seized, rationalizing that “property right[s] 
could be compromised in order to advance the common good.”50  The found-
ers, realizing both the importance of eminent domain and the importance of 
private property, balanced these goals in the Fifth Amendment.51  The Fifth 
Amendment codified the government’s authority to take property, but it also 
required the landowner to receive just compensation.52  The Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states, “[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use without just compensation.”53 
The term “just compensation” has been fairly easy to define and is gen-
erally accepted as the “fair market value of the property at the time of the 
taking.”54  The term “public use,” on the other hand, has been more difficult 
to decipher.55  It has been interpreted broadly to give the government the abil-
ity to advance the public good, but it also grants the government the discre-
tion to rein in misuses of eminent domain.56  This broad interpretation of pub-
lic use is what led to Kelo v. City of New London.57 
 Kelo involved a development plan in New London, Connecticut, in 
2000.58  New London was a very poor town with an unemployment rate close 
 
 47. Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legisla-
tion, Is the Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 407 (2007). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1985). 
 51. See Sperow, supra note 47, at 407-08. 
 52. See id. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 54. Sperow, supra note 47, at 408. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 406. 
 57. Id. at 405. 
 58. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
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to double that of the state.59  The population of the town was the lowest it had 
been since 1920.60  Due to these conditions, local and state officials targeted 
New London for economic revitalization.61  The State approved a $5.35 mil-
lion bond issue to fund a development plan by a nonprofit entity, New Lon-
don Development Corporation (“NLDC”).62  In February of 2000, the phar-
maceutical company Pfizer Inc. announced plans to build a $300 million re-
search facility in New London that local authorities hoped would help revital-
ize the city by generating business in the area.63  The development plan was 
approved by the city council and was projected to create over 1,000 jobs and 
to increase tax revenue.64  The city council selected NLDC to implement the 
development plan in a ninety-acre area.65  It also gave NLDC authority to 
acquire property by either negotiating a purchase price of the property with 
the owner or, if that failed, using eminent domain.66  Most property in the 
area was purchased from owners after negotiation.67  Where negotiation 
failed, the NLDC ordered the property to be condemned, which resulted in 
the Kelo lawsuit.68 
The petitioners’ property in this case was condemned due to its location 
in the development area, not because it was in poor condition or blighted.69  
The petitioners sued under the Fifth Amendment claiming that the taking of 
their property was not for a “public use” because private entities would re-
ceive the transfer of the property.70  They further argued that eminent domain 
should not be used for economic development because it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between the benefits of public and private parties.71 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding, 5-4, that New London’s 
development plan served a “public use.”72  The Court wrote that precedent 
had interpreted the word “public use” more broadly as “public purpose.”73  It 
stated that even though economic development may benefit private entities, a 
taking is still an acceptable public purpose where it adds new jobs and in-
creases the tax revenue.74  Yet, the Court did not preclude state legislatures 
 
 59. Id. at 473. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 472, 475. 
 65. Id. at 475. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 485. 
 72. Id. at 490. 
 73. Id. at 480. 
 74. Id. at 483-84. 
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from further restricting the use of eminent domain.75  The democratic process 
still allows individuals to vote for representatives who will limit takings in 
their state.  Kelo merely held that economic development fulfills the Fifth 
Amendment’s “public use” requirement and, therefore, land can be seized for 
that purpose.76 
Kelo has had a small number of public supporters who claim that a few 
property owners may be hurt, but that the Supreme Court decision will ulti-
mately help the residents of the community by increasing employment and 
tax revenue.77  The depressing result of Kelo was that Pfizer did not go 
through with its project, and New London’s overall economic development 
plan never came to fruition.78  Political parties from both sides of the spec-
trum decried the result.79  In one CNN poll, 66% of a 177,987 respondents 
said that local governments should never be able to seize property, even for 
public use.80  Across the nation, citizens were denouncing Kelo as the gov-
ernment overstepping its bounds.81  Following the ruling in Kelo, state legis-
latures rushed to approve legislation that would curtail eminent domain in 
their states.82  As of 2009, forty-three states had enacted legislation in re-
sponse to Kelo.83  The statutes vary in their effectiveness84 and can be sepa-
rated into several categories.85  Overall, Kelo propelled states to reevaluate 
 
 75. Id. at 489. 
 76. Id. at 490. 
 77. Editorial, The Limits of Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/opinion/24fri1.html?_r=0. 
 78. Katie Nelson, Conn. Land Taken from Homeowners Still Undeveloped, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 25, 2009 2:31 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/
2009939321_apuseminentdomain.html. 
 79. Somin, supra note 3, at 2108. 
 80. QuickVote Poll, supra note 2. 
 81. Somin, supra note 3, at 2108-09. 
 82. Id. at 2115-20. 
 83. Id. at 2102. 
 84. See 50 State Report Card Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation 
Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION (Aug. 2007), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/
publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf.  The Castle Coalition evaluated the 
“quality and strength of reforms passed in the states” and gave each state a grade from 
“A” to “F” based on the laws in effect in 2007.  Id. at 4.  The Coalition gave Missouri 
a grade of “D.”  Id. at 29. 
 85. Eminent Domain Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/eminent-domain-
overview.aspx (last visited June 8, 2014).  The National Conference of State Legisla-
tures categorizes the enacted state statutes into five different categories: (1) those that 
“restrict[] the use of eminent domain for economic development, enhancing tax reve-
nue or transferring private property to another private entity (or primarily for those 
purposes)”; (2) those that “[d]efine[] what constitutes public use”; (3) those that 
“[e]stablish[] additional criteria for designating areas subject to eminent domain”; (4) 
those that “[s]trengthen[] public notice, public hearing and landowner negotiation 
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their own eminent domain laws and to make changes that would reflect what 
the people of their state desired.86 
B. Missouri Eminent Domain 
Regarding eminent domain, the Missouri Constitution states: 
[t]hat private property shall not be taken for private use with or with-
out compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands 
of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner pre-
scribed by law; and that when an attempt is made to take private prop-
erty for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contem-
plated use be public shall be judicially determined without regard to 
any legislative declaration that the use is public.87 
Before Kelo, Missouri courts had interpreted the “public use” portion of 
the Missouri Constitution similarly to the Supreme Court’s interpretation in 
Kelo.88  Before Kelo, Missouri courts had construed “public use” to mean 
“public benefit.”89  For example, in 1998, a Missouri appellate court held that 
eminent domain that benefits private entities is constitutional “so long as the 
primary benefit is to the public.”90 
The media throughout Missouri responded to the Kelo decision with 
hostility.  The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Kansas City Star, and Columbia Tri-
bune all lambasted the ruling.91  Missouri, like many of the states, began to 
feel pressure from its citizens to reform eminent domain law.92  Five days 
after Kelo, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt organized a bipartisan task force to 
tackle eminent domain reform.93  The task force compiled suggestions, lis-
tened to witnesses of past condemnation actions, and wrote recommendations 
 
criteria, and requir[e] local government approval before condemning property”; and 
(5) those that “[r]equir[e] compensation at greater than fair market value.”  Id. 
 86. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 98 (2005).  Judge Posner states that the Kelo decision is 
pragmatic because “[w]hen the Court declines to invalidate an unpopular government 
power, it tosses the issue back into the democratic arena,” and “opponents of a broad 
interpretation of ‘public use’ . . . will have to roll up their sleeves and fight the battle 
in Congress and state legislatures.”  Id. 
 87. MO. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 88. Stanley A. Leasure & Carol J. Miller, Eminent Domain – Missouri’s Re-
sponse to Kelo, 63 J. MO. B. 178, 182 (2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. City of Kan. City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 91. Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Mem-
oir, 71 MO. L. REV. 721, 727 (2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 727-28. 
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about what should be incorporated in the bill.94  A proposed bill incorporated 
many of the task force’s recommendations.95  Although there was much pub-
lic outcry following Kelo, many senators felt that being connected with the 
bill was politically risky.96  The provisions that favored individual property 
rights seemed to upset the governments in the major cities of the state, as well 
as real estate developers.97  However, despite reservations and after signifi-
cant modification, House Bill 1444 was enacted into law.98 
An essential section of this legislation is Section 523.271.99  A provision 
of Section 523.271 states that “[n]o condemning authority shall acquire pri-
vate property through the process of eminent domain for solely economic 
development purposes.”100  This provision was the legislature’s specific re-
sponse to Kelo and bans eminent domain when a condemning authority has 
only an economic development purpose.101  Section 523.271 also defines 
economic development for the first time.102  “Economic Development,” under 
the statute, is defined as the “use of a specific piece of property or properties 
which would provide an increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment, 
and general economic health.”103  The intent of this language was to narrow 
the situations in which condemning authorities may take property.104 
The reception of Missouri’s legislation on eminent domain has been 
mixed.  Specific aspects of the legislation that are viewed as strong in protect-
ing property rights include its definition of “fair market value”105 and the 
requirement that 125% of that value be paid to homeowners.106  Also, the 
 
 94. Id. at 728-29. 
 95. Id. at 731. 
 96. Id. at 732. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 721, 733. 
 99. Id. at 737 n.83. 
 100. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2012). 
 101. Whitman, supra note 91, at 737. 
 102. Id. at 740. 
 103. § 523.271. 
 104. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 482 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 105. Whitman, supra note 91, at 764.  Fair market value is defined as: 
the value of the property taken after considering comparable sales in the area, 
capitalization of income, and replacement cost less depreciation, singularly or 
in combination, as appropriate, and additionally considering the value of the 
property based upon its highest and best use, using generally accepted ap-
praisal practices.  If less than the entire property is taken, fair market value 
shall mean the difference between the fair market value of the entire property 
immediately prior to the taking and the fair market value of the remaining or 
burdened property immediately after the taking. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 523.001(1) (2012). 
 106. Whitman, supra note 91, at 764.  Under the legislation, just compensation for 
the condemnation of a homeowner’s property is “an amount equivalent to the fair 
market value of such property multiplied by one hundred twenty-five percent.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 523.039(2) (2012). 
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statute’s prohibition of eminent domain solely for economic development and 
its protection of farmers from blight takings are viewed favorably.107  Yet, 
critics denounce the legislation as a minor change that in reality does not ac-
complish much.108  They highlight the government’s continued ability to 
seize property for private use and the failure of the statute to sufficiently limit 
blight takings as examples of areas that still need improvement.109   The crit-
ics view Florida’s legislation, which bans all takings for private benefit, as a 
model that Missouri should look to for eminent domain reform.110 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the loop 
track was included in the economic development plan, and thus the Port Au-
thority did not have a purpose separate from economic development.111  The 
court analyzed Section 523.271, which defines “economic development” as 
an increase in the following four factors: “tax base, tax revenues, employ-
ment, and general economic health.”112  To prove that the taking was not 
solely for economic development purposes, the court stated that the Port Au-
thority would need to have proven that one of the four factors listed above 
would not increase.113 
Instead of trying to prove that one of the four factors would not increase, 
the Port Authority argued that the construction of the loop track was a sepa-
rate purpose from the economic development.114  The circuit court agreed 
with the Port Authority and found two purposes separate from economic de-
velopment.115  The circuit court stated: 1) that the building of the loop track 
was a purpose separate from economic development, and 2) that improving 
river commerce was also a separate purpose.116 
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not agree with the circuit court that 
building the loop track was a purpose separate from economic develop-
ment.117  The court stated that the Port Authority’s desire to “promote growth 
in jobs and commerce through additional rail facilities” established that the 
track was built for economic development under the definition in Section 
 
 107. Timothy B. Lee, Property Rights Still in Danger a Year After Kelo, SHOW-
ME INSTITUTE (June 23, 2006), http://www.showmeinstitute.org/publications/comme-
ntary/corporate-welfare/298-property-rights-still-in-danger-a-year-after-kelo.html. 
 108. 50 State Report Card, supra note 84, at 29. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Lee, supra note 107. 
 111. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 481-82 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 112. Id. at 479; MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 113. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 479. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 479-80. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 482-83. 
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523.271.118  Because the purpose for constructing the loop track was solely 
for economic development, the Port Authority violated Section 523.271.119  
The court reasoned that if the loop track was considered separate from the 
economic development, that outcome would allow “any integral part of an 
economic development plan or project to be considered as a purpose that is 
separate and distinct from economic development.”120  This reading would be 
an easy loophole for future development projects to exploit and thus “render 
the statute a nullity.” 121 
The court also disagreed with the circuit court’s finding that improving 
river commerce was a separate purpose from economic development.122  The 
court stated that the Port Authority’s taking will only improve river com-
merce by bringing economic development into the area.123  River commerce, 
in this situation, will only be improved by the increase in employment and 
business that results from the economic development in the port district.124  
Hence, river commerce and the economic development in this case are inter-
twined.  The court listed examples of ways to improve river commerce that 
would be separate from economic development.125  Such examples include 
“dredging the river or building canals to allow for better barge access.”126  
The court acknowledged that Section 523.271 might make economic devel-
opment takings more challenging because it may be difficult for condemning 
authorities to establish a separate purpose.127 
V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in Jackson narrows the gov-
ernment’s ability to acquire land by eminent domain.  Now, a solely econom-
ic rationale will not suffice for future takings in Missouri.  This ruling has 
both positive and negative ramifications, as well as an implication on how 
future property may be acquired by eminent domain. 
A. Positive Consequences of Eminent Domain 
Despite the fervent hostility towards eminent domain, it does serve an 
important purpose in our economy.  There are certain situations when emi-
 
 118. Id. at 481. 
 119. Id. at 481-82. 
 120. Id. at 482. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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nent domain should be used for the betterment of the community.128  Respon-
sible uses of eminent domain include acquiring land for affordable housing 
and improving deteriorating neighborhoods.129  Existing highways, railroads, 
and canals, from which people derive benefits daily, could not have been 
built without eminent domain.130  A New York developer who specialized in 
urban housing stated that “[t]o do any kind of urban redevelopment without 
eminent domain is to eliminate half of the potential sites for redevelop-
ment.”131 
The result in Kelo has clouded many minds to the fact that there are suc-
cess stories when eminent domain is used responsibly, even for solely eco-
nomic development purposes.  There are times when eminent domain can 
provide an entire community with jobs and tax revenue.132  An example is 
Village West in Kansas City, Kansas.133  Here, 146 homes and four business-
es occupied a 400-acre area.134  Eminent domain was needed to acquire the 
property of just two landowners who refused to sell their property for the 
development of the area.135  As a result of the property acquisition, retail and 
entertainment businesses now occupy the land, boosting the local econo-
my.136  Village West has become the largest tourist attraction in Kansas.137  In 
2006, the Village West area brought in nine million visitors to its thirty-eight 
businesses and employed close to 3,500 people.138 
Eminent domain was instrumental in the area’s economic growth.  
Without the use of eminent domain, there is a possibility that the two hold-
outs could have prevented the development of the area.  In essence, two pal-
try property holdouts out of over 140 properties could have stood in the way 
of the creation of 3,500 jobs and yearly property tax revenue of around $6 
million for the city.139  This situation demonstrates that eminent domain can 
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 130. See Charles A. Szypszak, Ten Common Misconceptions About Eminent Do-
main, POPULAR GOV’T 43 (2009), http://sogpubs.unc.edu//electronicversions/pg/
pgwin09/article4.pdf?. 
 131. Michael Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain Backlash Threatens 
Some Projects, CHI. TRIBUNE (Aug. 14, 2005), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2005-08-14/business/0508140435_1_eminent-federal-money-supreme-court. 
 132. Douglas R. Porter, Eminent Domain: An Important Tool for Community 
Revitalization, URBAN LAND INST. 10 (2007), http://thejcra.org/jcra_files/File/resour-
ces/eminent%20domain.pdf. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 21. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Top Regional Developments, THINK KC, http://www.thinkkc.com/NewsEve-
nts/TopDevelopments/TopDevelopments.php (last visited July 9, 2014). 
 138. Porter, supra note 132. 
 139. Id. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss3/5
2014] TAKINGS CARE OF BUSINESS 727 
be a useful tool even if used for solely economic development purposes.  
When used properly, eminent domain has the potential to provide economic 
opportunities to a community. 
The ruling in Jackson will very likely stifle some of these potential eco-
nomic opportunities in the state.  Missouri could be at a disadvantage when it 
comes to attracting jobs compared to other states that allow takings for solely 
economic development purposes.  Jackson lessened the chance that a $20 
million port project would advance.140  The court’s interpretation of Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 523.271 “made it difficult – if not impossible – for 
the Port Authority to advance its purposes through the use of eminent do-
main.”141  Because of the ruling, thirty to forty new jobs will no longer be 
available in the area.142  This ruling also makes it difficult for all Missouri 
ports along the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers to expand and grow in the 
future.143  It is now nearly impossible for any of the port authorities in Mis-
souri to use eminent domain for any purpose.144  This is because Section 
68.020 states that the port authorities’ main purpose is to stimulate economic 
development in the port district.145  It will be difficult for the port authorities 
to claim that they have a purpose aside from economic development when the 
statute specifically states that their main purpose is for economic develop-
ment in their port districts.146 
Eminent domain is also very useful for preventing one individual from 
holding hostage an entire group of property owners who want to sell their 
land.147  The problem of individuals holding out arises when a property owner 
knows that his parcel of land is essential to the completion of a project.148  
Every other property owner that has land essential to the completion of the 
project may be willing to sell her land at a reasonable price.149  The one hold-
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and Takings 1 (Univ. of Conn. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 200622, 2006), 
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out, on the other hand, knows the project cannot be completed without her 
parcel of land and, therefore, she is not willing to settle unless her excessive 
selling price is met.150  This problem has been characterized as a form of mo-
nopoly power and cannot be overcome unless the excessive selling price is 
met or eminent domain is used.151  Even just the threat of eminent domain is 
enough to cause many stubborn land owners to negotiate a more reasonable 
selling price.152 
With the result in Jackson, eminent domain cannot be used to prevent a 
holdout problem unless the land is blighted or there is an additional purpose 
aside from economic development for seizure.153  Now the valuable tool of 
threatening eminent domain is useless, and landowners can sit on their prop-
erty rights as long as they desire, waiting for a government entity to match 
their inflated prices.  A group of property owners willing to sell their land is 
now at the mercy of an obstinate property owner who is holding out for a 
premium.  Even if a property owner is motivated to keep his land because of 
its sentimental value, is it reasonable to allow one holdout to prevent forty, 
twenty, or even five willing property owners from selling their land?  There is 
also the possibility that a landowner may not care about the best interest of 
the community because he does not reside in Missouri.  Hypothetically, under 
the statute, a person who owns land in Missouri but resides in another state 
could block an entire development project.  This situation would be unfair to 
the local neighbors who wish to sell their property and to the community 
which desires the economic surplus the development could provide. 
B. Negative Ramifications of Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain is sometimes useful, but there are justifiable reasons to 
oppose eminent domain and applaud the Jackson ruling.  A significant reason 
eminent domain is so strongly disparaged is because some see it as an overex-
tension of the government’s power to infringe on the free market and individ-
ual property rights.154  Opponents believe that eminent domain for economic 
development is a battle that unfairly pits “private, politically powerful indi-
viduals and corporations” against the weaker-situated individual whose prop-
erty is in jeopardy of being taken.155  To opponents, eminent domain is the 
government “taking grandma out of her house.”156 
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Much of the negativity surrounding eminent domain also revolves 
around the fact that the compensation for the acquired property generally 
does not consider factors outside the property’s fair market value.157  Reloca-
tion expenses and the difficulty of finding an affordable replacement home 
are not factored into the compensation.158  The subjective value of the proper-
ty to the resident is also not part of the fair market value.159  Overall, the rea-
soning behind the disdain for eminent domain is best summarized as a view 
that “the government sometimes exercises its power of eminent domain in a 
way that is both inefficient and detrimental to the interests of politically un-
connected, vulnerable individuals and groups.”160 
Unfortunately, as the result of Kelo proved, the government sometimes 
is inefficient in its use of eminent domain.  There are other occasions, similar 
to the one in Kelo, where the government has tampered with the free market 
by using eminent domain, and the results are detrimental.  For example, in 
1998, the City of Phoenix condemned a non-blighted grocery store and sever-
al other small businesses in the hopes of transferring the land to a private 
developer.161  Eight years later, the city had not found a developer to buy the 
property, which still remains vacant.162 
Another example of government inefficiency is the 1981 case of 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.163  The Michigan Su-
preme Court ruled that the City of Detroit could use eminent domain to evict 
4,200 people from their homes and demolish 140 businesses, six churches, a 
hospital, and several non-profits.164  The City of Detroit took this action so 
that General Motors could build an automobile plant that it envisioned would 
create 6,000 jobs.165  The grim reality is only 2,500 people were employed at 
the plant and it is estimated that the demolition of the neighborhood for the 
plant actually resulted in a net loss of jobs.166  The Michigan Supreme Court 
eventually reversed this case in 2004, but the irreparable damage to the his-
toric neighborhood had already occurred.167 
 
 157. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 106 (2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 107-08. 
 160. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question As a Takings Problem, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 952 (2003). 
 161. Redevelopment Wrecks: 20 Failed Projects Involving Eminent Domain 
Abuse, CASTLE COALITION 13 (June 2006), http://castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/
Redevelopment%20Wrecks.pdf. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 5 (discussing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 
Mich. 616 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445 
(Mich. 2004)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 6. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
15
Cooksey: Takings Care of Business
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
730 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
These cases are just two of many examples where the government has 
interfered on behalf of the private sector by taking private property, and the 
result has been less than ideal.  The ruling in Jackson will help lessen these 
types of takings in Missouri by prohibiting eminent domain when the purpose 
is only for economic development.168  Corporations such as General Motors 
will not be able to use an “increase in the tax base, tax revenues, employment, 
and general economic health” as the sole rationale for taking property from a 
person.169  A purpose will need to be cited in addition to economic develop-
ment before the government may use eminent domain.170 
C. Future Takings in Missouri 
The ruling in Jackson will have both positive and negative implications 
for Missouri, but the ruling will also likely affect how future developers at-
tempt to use eminent domain.  The Port Authority in Jackson failed to prove 
that it had a purpose in addition to the purpose of economic development.171  
The court’s ruling will probably encourage future developers wishing to use 
eminent domain to shy away from mentioning economic development. 
Instead, future parties will probably attempt to use the blight exception 
in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 523.271 for eminent domain.172  Mis-
souri’s definition of blight is considered by some commentators to be very 
broad.173  Under Section 99.805, blight is defined as an area that “constitutes 
an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, mor-
als, or welfare in its present condition and use.”174  This is an extremely broad 
definition and it is one of the main reasons that the Missouri Statute is graded 
a “D” by the Institute for Justice’s property rights activism project: the Castle 
Coalition.175 
Most property can still be taken under the blight exception.176  All it 
takes is some clever lawyering and an affluent developer for property to be 
construed under the statute as blighted.177  Cities are still allowed to condemn 
neighborhoods for developers based on the ambiguous standards of “defec-
tive or inadequate street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration 
 
 168. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 482 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 169. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.271 (2012). 
 170. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 481. 
 171. Id. 
 172. § 523.271.  The definition of economic development “does not include the 
elimination of blighted, substandard, or unsanitary conditions, or conditions rendering 
the property or its surrounding area a conservation area as defined in [S]ection 
99.805.”  Id. 
 173. Somin, supra note 3, at 2124. 
 174. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(a) (2012). 
 175. 50 State Report Card, supra note 84, at 29. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss3/5
2014] TAKINGS CARE OF BUSINESS 731 
of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting.”178  Most 
likely, future government agencies and municipalities will abandon trying to 
claim their use of eminent domain is for a purpose in addition to economic 
development, and instead will use the blight exception as a way to obtain the 
property that they desire. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain can be used as a beneficial tool, but its use can also be 
detrimental.  The result in Jackson will protect individual property rights, 
while also making it nearly impossible for port authorities along the Missis-
sippi and Missouri Rivers to develop and expand their operations.  Future 
development projects that rely solely on economic development purposes 
may find it more difficult to acquire land through eminent domain without an 
additional purpose.   This difficulty will encourage future developers to label 
more properties as blighted to attempt to bypass the stringent requirement of 
economic development takings.  Missouri will have to confront these issues 
eventually; for now though, proponents of property rights can applaud the 
Supreme Court of Missouri for deciding in their favor when confronted with 
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